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A Change in Macroeconomic Thinking
Abstract
"Left to its own devices, Keynes felt that there was no way a free market system, even with downwardly
flexible wages and prices, could guarantee full employment."
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Thomas Kuhn, in his seminal work
entitled "The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions," notes that when the
progression of reality transcends and
otherwise appears incompatible with the
paradigms devised to explain such events,
new venues of thought will be proposed. If
these newly proposed paradigms are
popularly perceived to explain the
happenings under consideration better than
those in existence, they will eventually
displace them, becoming the accepted tool of
analysis. The 1930s was such a period. A
severe economic depression debiitated much
of the industrialized world, adversely
affecting nearly every economic indicator
measured,
most
notably
leaving
unemployment levels at historically high
levels. Accepted classical notions of supply
and demand and the abiity of markets to
clear apparently were describing the
sconomic operations in some mystical
utopia. Adam Smith's "invisible hand" for
equilibrating the markets of the modem
economy had never been so invisible. As
was evident, there were grave deficiencies
between the accepted economic paradigms
of the classical school and events in the real
world. At about this time, a talented and
vocal economic philosopher by the name of
John Maynard Keynes, son of the notable
economist John Neville Keynes, was
enjoying the heyday of his professional
career. When the dust had settled, the
institution of modem political economy for
the next thirty years had been revolutionized.
John Maynard Keynes' most notable
disagreement with the classical school
occurred over what was perhaps the most
conspicuous economic problem of the time-employment, or lack thereof The classical
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economists had essentially taken Say's Law
(the notion that supply creates its own
demand) as the standard by which they
performed their macroeconomic analysis.
The classical school believed that the
economy must automatically adjust to a
position of fUll employment, and that at this
position the interest rate would ensure that
aggregate savings equaled aggregate
investment. Savings, the classicists argued,
was positively related to the interest rate by
encouraging people to forsake current
consumption for a greater amount of future
consumption.
Investment is negatively
related to the interest rate as it alters the
opportunity cost to firms of investment at the
margin. If investment increases, the interest
rate would rise, causing people to transfer a
portion of the income fiom consumption into
savings. Thus, as the loanable hnds market
ensured a ready demand for goods and
services by balancing investment and
consumption, fke markets and rapid interest
rate responses more or less guaranteed fill
employment.
Keynes protested the fkciie naivetC of the
classical model of savings and investment
determination, showing that investors'
"animal spirits" and their desire for shortterm gain cause investment decisions to
revolve around "anticipating what average
opinion expects the average rate to be," far
adrift of even any recognition of interest rate
levels.
Keynes also believed that
consumption and saving are functions of
aggregate income, rather than the real
interest rate as the classical school had
contended. Thus, he asserted that a rise in
the interest rate will cause no change in
consumption and savings. With this new
model dependent upon the income level,
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unemployed workers would competitively
bid the real wage down to a level which
facilitated full employment. Classicists saw
no need to question the willingness of
workers to accept lower wages or
entrepreneurs to automatically lower their
prices in order to allow the economy to
return to its optimal position.
Keynes, however, did. He argued that
laborers supplied labor with respect to the
nominal wage, and thus lived under a
"money illusion," which impelled them to
refuse to take cuts in their nominal wages.
Long-term labor contracts also served the
purpose of precluding cuts in nominal wages.
As a consequence, structural or involuntary
unemployment would become the norm
following a reduction in aggregate demand.
Firms faced with lower revenues would be
unable to reduce costs by lowering wage
rates, leading either to layoffs or a distinct
absence of new employees. Since there is no
tendency for the employment rate to shift
from this point, equilibrium in. the labor
market would be established at a level below
full employment. In fact, equilibrium could
be established at any utilization of labor, not
just at the level of full employment as
classicists had contended. Keynes reinforced
his argument against the classicists'
conviction that the wage-price adjustment
mechanism would ensure full employment by
showing that even if workers willingly
accepted a diminution of their wages, the
wage-price adjustment mechanism would
still be incapable of effecting full
employment. Because a firm's profit margin
is determined by prices and wages, the
employment capabilities of finns are
dependent on the real wage. It is this that
must decrease if full employment is to be
achieved. Due to the fact that widespread
wage reductions would lower aggregate
demand, Keynes argued via the classicists t
own wage-price adjustment mechanism--as
lower aggregate demand translates into

Keynes saw no guarantee that savings and
investment would necessarily be equal at a
level of economic activity that p~oduced full
employment. Keynes showed that after a
given level of income, the aggregate supply
of goods and services begins to outstrip
aggregate demand, which includes both the
demand for consumption and investment
goods and services. In other words, the
aggregate cost of producing that higher level
of output would exceed the receipts
obtainable from consumption and investment
expenditures at that level. In such a case,
unsold inventories would build up, forcing
entrepreneurs to cut back production to the
level at which aggregate demand and
aggregate supply were equal.
Thus,
although the output level generated by
consumption and investment is stable, it is
not necessarily the full-employment level of
national output.

"Left to its own devices,
Keynes felt that there was no
way a free market system,
even with downwardly
flexible wages and prices,
could guarantee full
employment."
In addition to the self-regulating
mechanism of responsive interest rates within
the loanable funds market, the classical
school relied upon flexible wages and prices
to equilibrate the goods market. Given low
aggregate demand as a result ot: for instance,
a sluggish loanable funds market, money,
wages and prices would fail to ensure the
economy returned to its position of full
employment and full production.
For
example, if the real wage were at a level
which
resulted
in
unemployment,
S6

;
[

Y

1

excess supply of goods and services, wage
reductions must precipitate a commensurate
fall in prices. And as a price fall would
accom~anythe wage cut, real wages would
remain constant, leaving employment levels
unchanged.
Left to its own devices, Keynes felt that
there was no way a fke market system, even
with downwardlj flexible wages-and prices,
could guarantee fill employment. In fact,
Keynes showed that an exogenous reduction
in aggregate demand would cause
production and employment levels to
stabilize below their optimal levels. This
unemployment and underproduction could
be relieved by increasing aggregate demand,
or one of its components (consumption or
investment) by the Merence between the
levels of aggregate supply and denyind at M
production. As alluded to earlier, Keynes
viewed private investment decisions with a
heavy dose of skepticism, believing they
were volatile, motivated by capricious
psychological factors and desire for shortterm financial gain, more or less making
them analogous to the decisions made by
gamblers in a casino. As a result, Keynes
didn't hold much hope that private
investment finds would p&de the s&nulus
of aggregate demand.
Keynes also rejected the somewhat
popular tool of monetary policy, believing it
was unable to affect the increase in
aggregate demand necessary to restore hll
employment levels and, in turn, rejecting the
accompanying conclusions drawn by
neoclassicists fiom their quantity theory of
money. Neoclassicists argued that the
money supply could be adjusted to produce
changes when there are unemployed
resources in the economy. Keynes, however,
disagreed over one apparently minor but
ultimately critical point; he felt that in
addition to transactions and precautionary
purposes, individuals hold money in order to
speculate in the bond market. When interest

rates are high, individuals prefer to hold
bonds, but as the interest rate falls bond
prices rise, rendering the holding of bonds
less and less attractive and the selling of
them more and more attractive. Thus, as the
interest rate falls, more and more people
choose to hold their assets in the form of
money. Keynesians argue that the interest
rate may eventually fall to so low a positive
level as to encourage everybody to hold the
more liquid asset of money instead of the
now unsafe bonds for speculative purposes.
According to Keynes, this renders monetary
policy completely ineffective in the fhce of
depression or unemployment since changes
in the money supply cannot alter the interest
rates which are used to influence spending,
income and employment.
Keynes, therefore, felt that a strong fiscal
policy--as opposed to sole reliance on
monetary policy--was the only reliable means
to achieve economic stabilization. Keynes
argued that the government should use its
powers to tax and spend in order to influence
the business cycle by providing direct
injections of public investment into the
income stream. As investment expenditures
affect income not by the amount of the
spending change, but by some multiple
determined by the marginal propensity to
consume, spending increases will result in
manifold rises in the level of production.
Such spending increases could be financed
by tax increases (although this would reduce
consumption, the multiplicative effects of an
increase in government spending outweigh
those of a tax increase, so the overall effect
on the economy would be positive), by the
sale of bonds to the Federal Reserve or by
some other means. Keynes looked for a MIscale program of discretionary fiscal policy
and the strengthening of built-in
macroeconomic stabilizers such
as
progressive taxation.
Within a few years, these notions had
permeated virtually every economic
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institution in the Western world, from the
offices of economic advisers and policy
makers to the classrooms of institutions of
higher learning. This led to the inaction of
higher marginal tax rates, burgeoning
expenditure programs, welfare benefits and
public work projects, and ultimately
bequeathing a bitter legacy of astronomical

debt to future the power brokers of nations
who adopted the Keynesian model. For
three decades, from the conclusion of the
second World War to the oil crises of the
1970s, Keynesian notions formed much of
the basis for governmental intervention in the
economy. Macroeconomics would never be
the same.

Andrew Death ('00) is a double major in Economics and Political Science. He hopes to continue
his education in Economics with graduate school following his undergraduate studies. This paper
was written for The History ofEconomic Thought, taught by Dr. Chapman.
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